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1. Introduction: trilemma versus national policy space and why it matters
In his best seller, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World
Economy, Dani Rodrik (2011) introduced the notion of the globalization political
trilemma which has quickly gained widespread currency. According to Rodrik, there is an
inescapable conflict between economic globalization, the nation state, and democratic
politics. Countries can have any two, but not all three.
This paper critiques the trilemma framing of the political economy of
globalization, and offers an alternative framing rooted in the construct of national policy
space. Globalization causes changes in national policy space that have drop-down
implications for national sovereignty and democratic politics. Globalization involves
choices regarding the “degree”, the “type”, and the “dimensions” of international
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economic integration. Contrary to the trilemma, the multi-faceted nature of the choices
means there are no inevitable implications for sovereignty or democracy.
The trilemma framing has done a major service by redirecting attention to the
political governance implications of globalization. Those impacts and their consequences
are insufficiently attended to, especially by economists who focus on the immediate
narrowly defined economic impacts. That said, the paper presents a critique of the
trilemma which is in part technical critique, and in part political critique. The technical
critique concerns the trilemma’s framing of the mechanics and impacts of globalization.
The political critique is that the trilemma’s framing of the mechanics risks misdirecting
the policy conversation and obscuring political responsibility for anti-democratic
developments.
The paper is related to an important paper by Stein (2016) which is concerned
with many of same issues that motivate the current paper. Stein frames the discussion in
terms of frictions between democracy, sovereignty, and globalization. However, at the
end of the day, he persists with the usefulness of the trilemma framing. In contrast, the
current paper argues the problematic of globalization is better channeled (theoretically
and politically) through the frame of national policy space.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 -3 critically assess the
globalization political trilemma, while sections 4 – 7 provide an alternative model based
on the construct of national policy space. Section 2 revisits the trilemma hypothesis.
Section 3 deconstructs the trilemma and surfaces various analytical concerns. Section 4
presents an encompassing model for understanding globalization, which is then expanded
in the rest of the paper. Section 5 expands the analysis to represent globalization as a
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politically sponsored twisting of national policy space. Section 6 further expands the
analysis to incorporate policy lock-in. Section 7 discusses some of the implications of the
proposed framework for nation state democratic politics. Section 8 concludes.
2. The globalization political trilemma hypothesis revisited
Rodrik’s “globalization trilemma” hypothesis pivots linguistically off the
“macroeconomic policy trilemma” coined by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997), which has been
relabeled the “impossible trinity” by Krugman (1999). The impossible trinity is an
argument about international economic arrangements.1 The globalization trilemma is an
analogue argument about international political economy, and it rests on the assumption
that there exists a fundamental tension between globalization, the nation state, and
democracy.
Figure 1 reproduces Rodrik’s (2011, p. 201) globalization political trilemma.
There are three characteristics to the political economic system: hyper-globalization, the
nation state, and democratic politics. The argument is that countries can have any two
characteristics but not all three. To illustrate the trade-off, Rodrik identifies three different
political regimes: the golden straitjacket regime which corresponds to the 19th century
gold standard when there was hyper-globalization with nation states; the Bretton Woods
regime of the mid-20th century when democratic nation states imposed limits on
globalization via tariffs and quotas, managed exchange rates, and capital mobility
controls; and an imagined 21st century regime of hyper-globalization in a world where the
nation state has disappeared and been replaced by global democratic governance.
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The impossible trinity argument concerns the consistency of flexible exchange rates, international
financial capital mobility, and monetary policy effectiveness.
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Figure 1. The globalization political trilemma.
Source: Rodrik (2011, p. 201)
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The three regimes are distinct, with each having two of the three characteristics.
The golden straitjacket regime is claimed to be inconsistent with democratic politics; the
Bretton Woods compromise is inconsistent with hyper-globalization; and the global
governance regime is inconsistent with the nation state.
3. Critique of the globalization political trilemma
This section presents a two-part critique of the globalization trilemma. Figure 2 begins
the critique by re-labelling the trilemma diagram.2 “Hyper-globalization” is re-labelled as
“Deep international economic integration”; the “Golden straitjacket” is re-labelled as
“Deep integration via laissez-faire”; “Global governance” is re-labelled as “”Deep
integration via global rule-making”; and the “Bretton Woods compromise” is re-labelled
as “Managed country specific economic integration”. Lastly, the “nation state” is
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The relabeled trilemma is similar to that implicit in Stein (2016), though he does not actually produce
such a diagram.
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replaced by “national sovereignty”.3 The re-labelling exercise helps surface the
analytical problems within the original construction.

Figure 2. The globalization political trilemma re-labelled.
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3.a) Claims about globalization’s impact on national sovereignty and democratic politics.
A first set of problems concerns the base of the triangle and the claims about the impact
of different globalization regimes on national sovereignty and democratic politics.
National sovereignty refers to the ability to control the rules of governance and influence
economic outcomes within a country’s borders. According to the trilemma diagram,
global integration via laissez-faire leaves national sovereignty intact and unaffected. That
claim is suspect. Deep global integration means borders are open to the inflow of goods,
services, capital, and people. As long as the rules of the game endure, a country is unable
to adjust the terms of entry which are a critical dimension of governance. The 19th

In the text discussing the trilemma, Rodrik (2011, p.201) refers to “national self-determination” but,
unfortunately, does not use that terminology in his trilemma diagram.
3
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century laissez-faire system was also based on the gold standard. That system involved a
degree of loss of sovereignty via commitment to a fixed gold exchange parity. Today’s
financial system also involves losses of sovereignty as countries commit to accounting
standards and financial regulations. The bottom line is any form of international
agreement tacitly constitutes a loss of sovereignty, and it is ontologically impossible to
think of deep international economic integration without such agreements.
On the other side of the triangle’s base, the trilemma claims integration by global
rule making involves total loss of national sovereignty. That too is suspect. Global
rulemaking does involve surrender of exclusive national decision making, but “effective”
national sovereignty may be enhanced. Effective sovereignty is defined as a country’s
ability to shape and control what goes on within its borders.
The international economy is intrinsically relational. As discussed further in
Section 4 below, what a country can do depends on what other countries are doing and on
the technologies governing production and commerce in the global economy. Given that,
effective sovereignty may be enhanced by joining a collective rulemaking group in which
a country has a seat at the table. There is need to distinguish between “effective” and
“formal” sovereignty. Laissez-faire globalization retains formal national sovereignty but
may undermine effective national sovereignty. Collective rulemaking undercuts formal
national sovereignty but may enhance effective national sovereignty.4
The trilemma’s framing of the impact of globalization regimes on democratic
politics is equally fraught. Here, it fails to distinguish between national politics,
democracy as process, and the content of democratic politics.
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This point is made by Verovšek (2020) in connection with the Brexit debate.
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Collective global rulemaking supposedly retains democratic politics. However, it
suppresses national democratic politics. As part of that, the democratic process is
significantly altered since the electorate becomes global, which substantially diminishes
the sense of representation felt by national citizens. That is a very different picture from
the trilemma’s presentation of democratic politics being maintained.
Side-by-side, laissez-faire globalization supposedly eliminates democratic
politics. However, there is no reason to believe national democratic politics disappears
since the process remains intact (as exemplified by post-Brexit politics in the UK). That
said, laissez-faire globalization may diminish the “content” of national democratic
politics, with augmented global market competition undermining the viability of some
policies and thereby taking them off the table, de facto. That possibility is real, but it also
implicitly challenges the trilemma’s claim that laissez-faire globalization leaves national
sovereignty unaffected.
In sum, deconstructing the globalization political trilemma highlights the need to
distinguish between the “process” of democracy and the “content” of democracy,
“formal” sovereignty versus “effective” sovereignty, and “national” democracy versus
“global” democracy. Recognizing those distinctions dissolves the trilemma’s claim that
deep integration either leaves either sovereignty unaffected or democratic politics
unaffected. Sovereign democratic nation states operate in a context. Globalization
inevitably changes that context in ways which inevitably implicate both sovereignty and
democracy.
3.b) Incomplete regime possibility set.
A second set of problems concerns the trilemma’s identification of the regime possibility
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set. The triangle is supposed to identify all the possible economic globalization regimes.
The base corresponds to shallow international economic integration, whereas the righthand side (RHS) and left-hand side (LHS) of the triangle correspond to regimes of deep
international economic integration under alternative governance regimes. Figure 3
contains a 2x2 matrix, defined over governance (nation state vs. global) and type of
integration (laissez-faire vs. social democratic), which illustrates the mix of possible
regimes. Missing from the trilemma is the possibility that nation states may negotiate a
social democratic deep integration regime with high standards. Yet, as discussed in
Section 5 below, the type of economic integration has critical implications for national
sovereignty and democratic politics. In sum, to understand globalization’s political
impacts it is necessary to unpack both the governance structure and the type of
globalization, which jointly determine the political implications.

Figure 3. Regimes of deep economic integration.

Economic integration
Laissez-faire

Governance

Nation
state
Global
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?
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4. National policy space: reframing the political economy of globalization
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The trilemma identifies three different economic policy regimes and seeks to attach
political implications. This section reframes the political economy of globalization in
terms of national policy space. In the initial simple model, that renders the political
economy of globalization as a dilemma rather than trilemma. In the expanded model, it
may or may not pose a dilemma.
Figure 4 shows the framework which generates a political cascade. Nation states
face a choice regarding the degree of globalization, with the choice ranging from autarky
to hyper-globalization. The degree of globalization is determined by the rules of
international economic integration. Those rules impact the range of national policy space
which, in turn, has dropdown implications for nation state democratic politics.

Figure 4. The globalization dilemma: economic integration, policy space, and democracy.
(+ = more policy space, - = less policy space)

(-)

(+)
Autarky

Hyper-globalization

Rules of international
economic integration

National policy space

Implications for nation
state democratic politics

According to Figure 4 national democratic politics are implicated by globalization
via the latter’s impact on national policy space. As discussed in sections 4 and 5, the
impact on policy space depends on the particulars of the way in which global economic
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integration is designed. Additionally, globalization’s impact on policy space operates
through direct and indirect channels. As regards direct impacts, it can affect policy
content via global governance treaty arrangements that have national governments
surrender a degree of sovereignty and intentionally handcuff themselves by agreeing to
limits on what they can do (Gill, 1998; Gill and Cutler, 2014). As regards indirect
impacts, it can affect the “policy content” of democratic politics by undermining the
effectiveness of policy modalities and instruments, thereby de facto restricting policy
choices.
For sovereignty and democracy, the question is how do these policy space impacts
play out with regard to policy effectiveness and political practice? The impact of treaty
agreements on policy possibilities is self-explanatory. However, the impact of reduced
policy effectiveness on policy possibilities is tacit. It works via globalization induced
changes in economic structure that undermine the feasibility and effectiveness of policy.
Thus, policies that were previously effective may become ineffective. Alternatively, they
may become too costly to pursue, rendering them de facto ineffective. Examples of this
are corporate taxation and regulation which can become less viable owing to the threat of
capital mobility.
There are several important features to notice about Figure 4. First, globalization
is a continuum, rather than a binary choice. Furthermore, as argued in Section 5 below,
there are also different “types” of globalization and different “dimensions” of
globalization which have different policy characteristics that further complicate the
argument.
Second, the assumption in Figure 2 is that increased globalization diminishes
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national policy space, as indicated by the plus and minus signs. That reflects the framing
of globalization as a one dimensional phenomenon, which is also the conventional
assumption. However, as argued in Section 5 below, a more refined treatment of
globalization shows that is not necessarily so and the policy space impact depends on the
type of globalization.
Third, the political impact of globalization on democracy operates indirectly via
globalization’s impact on national policy space. That indirect impact is critical and
introduces the important distinction between the “process” of democratic politics versus
the “policy content” and “quality” of democratic politics.
Globalization has no automatic impact on the process of democratic politics,
regardless of degree or type of globalization. However, globalization impacts economic
outcomes and it can impact the policy content of democratic politics via its impacts on
national policy space. How those impacts play out politically is highly contingent and
dependent on the responses of national political establishments.
4. A simple model: theorizing the relation between globalization and national policy
space
Figure 4 maps the causal chain between globalization and nation state democratic
politics. The next step is to excavate and theorize the mechanics of that chain. The impact
of globalization on national policy space is central to the argument. The mechanics of that
impact is illustrated in Figure 5 which provides a graphical formalization of the
relationship between globalization and policy space.
A country’s policy space is described by a policy index (P) which captures the
amount of policy space it has. Higher values of P confer greater policy space, which
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yields a wider feasible range for the policy target (X). The policy index declines as
globalization (G) increases, which reduces the feasible range for the policy target
variable. In Figure 5 there is a single policy target (which enables two dimensional
graphical representation). In reality, there is a vector of policy targets.

Figure 5. Globalization and national policy space.

National policy
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Policy target
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G0
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Globalization

The right-hand panel of Figure 5 shows that policy space decreases as the
globalization increases. The relationship is represented as non-linear. Initially,
globalization may produce only small losses of policy space: then the losses may steepen
as the impacts of deeper globalization begin to bite; and once the system is highly
globalized, the policy space losses from further marginal increases in globalization may
slow again. The current level of globalization is G0.
The left-hand panel shows the range of the policy target variable that national
policymakers can achieve. As globalization increases and national policy space declines,
the achievable range shrinks. For a given level of globalization, G0, the achievable range
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of the policy target variable (X) that the policymaker can hit is [X0,+ , X-]. The upper limit
is X0,+ and the lower limit is X-. In Figure 5, the achievable range shrinks as globalization
deepens owing to a decline in the achievable upper limit (i.e. the best outcome).
Figure 5 captures the logic of Keynes’ (1933) famous essay titled “National SelfSufficiency”. In that essay, Keynes argued for a retreat from international economic
openness, and especially financial capital mobility. The essence of his argument for a
greater degree of national self-sufficiency and economic isolation among countries was to
allow them policy space to pursue different national ideals:
“But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and conveniently
possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national….the policy of an
increased national self-sufficiency is to be considered, not as an ideal in itself,
but as directed to the creation of an environment in which other ideals can be
safely and conveniently pursued (Keynes, 1933).”
For Keynes, the issue was not about internationalization (i.e. globalization) being in
contradiction with the democratic process. It was about internationalization restricting the
policy space in which democratic nations could pursue different social ideals.
From the perspective of the nation state there is no trilemma, only a dilemma.
National sovereignty or the nation state can be identified with national policy space.
Globalization creates a trade-off between national policy space and the degree of
globalization, with national policy space declining as globalization deepens. It is in that
specific sense that there is a conflict between globalization and the nation state.
Globalization diminishes national sovereignty (i.e. the nation state) by diminishing
national policy space.
In fact, the problem is likely more complex than illustrated in Figure 5 because a
country that seeks to avoid globalization may still find its policy space impacted by
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globalization. This is illustrated in Figure 6. Let G* denote the degree of globalization in
the rest of the world. As globalization increases in the rest of the world (G*0 < G*1),
policy space decreases in country i despite unchanged local engagement with
globalization (Pi,0(Gi,0, G*1) < Pi,0(Gi,0, G*0)), which reduces the achievable range of the
policy target (Xi,0+( Gi,0, G*1) < Xi,0+( Gi,0, G*0)).

Figure 6. The effect of increased globalization in the rest of the world (G*0 < G*1) on national policy
space in country i.

National policy
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Figure 6 describes a critical under-appreciated aspect of globalization. That aspect
is increased globalization by other countries can impose a negative externality in the form
of reduced policy space for non-participating countries. That is because the international
economy is intrinsically “relational”. Consequently, when other countries deepen their
globalization, that can impose additional constraints on countries because it may
negatively impact the latter’s network of relations. The exact nature of the impacts will
depend on the type of globalization adopted by the rest of the world.
Figures 5 and 6 constitute a unified analytical framework. Figure 5 shows
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globalization as a choice, with countries choosing their degree of globalization. Figure 6
shows globalization is also something that happens to countries owing to outside
developments. The full picture involves both.
Though not the main focus of the current paper, the above framing of
globalization in terms of policy space spotlights an economic cost that is over-looked by
economists in their cost-benefit assessment of globalization. Mainstream (i.e.
neoclassical) economics views globalization through the lens of mutually beneficial
exchange, with globalization offering expanded opportunity for such exchange. That
perspective inevitably lends itself to the conclusion that globalization is welfare
enhancing, leaving only the “scale” of gains up for debate. A policy space perspective
questions that since loss of policy space can impose significant costs. Those costs depend
on the character of the economy and the value of policy interventions. In a perfectly
competitive economy (i.e. the neoliberal assumption) that value is small. However, in a
Keynesian economy that value may be large.
As regards democracy, the effects are complex. The first point is that globalization
impacts both democratic and non-democratic governments. It does so by impinging
“policy space”. In the above model, for both regimes there is no trilemma, just a dilemma
between the benefits of globalization versus the costs of changed policy space. Second,
the democratic process per se is unaffected. Third, globalization may diminish the
“content” of democratic politics, as measured by policy space and the achievable range of
the policy target. However, the content of democratic politics might be better considered
an issue of sovereignty. Fourth, there may be adverse indirect impacts on democracy if
diminished policy content causes political frustrations that generate an anti-democratic
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backlash, as discussed in Section 7 below. Those last two points show the interconnectedness of democracy and sovereignty, which runs counter to the trilemma’s
construction. If there is a threat to democracy, it runs though “content” and not through
“process”.
5. Refining the model: globalization as politically driven twisting of national policy
space
Both the trilemma and the model in the previous section described globalization as a
monolithic single-dimensioned phenomenon, in which case it poses a dilemma between
deep global economic integration and national policy space. This section refines the
model by introducing a distinction between different “types” of globalization and
different “dimensions”. That expands the choice set and makes politics even more
important. It also means that not every choice is a dilemma.
In many regards, the discussion of globalization has been compromised by the
intellectual hegemony of neoliberalism, which has encouraged thinking about
globalization exclusively in terms of neoliberalism. Globalization is defined as deep
global economic integration. Neoliberal globalization is organized according to neoliberal
principles. However, global integration can also be organized along other political
economic lines.
That possibility introduces different “types’ of globalization and political
preferences, which has significant analytic implications. The model in Section 4
emphasized the “degree” of globalization. Now, there is also need to consider the “type”
of globalization. Moreover, both degree and type will depend on political preferences,
rendering globalization a politically driven twisting of national policy space.
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That has significant implications. First, whether or not globalization even poses a
dilemma now depends on preferences, as those who win from globalization (i.e. get to
implement their preferred globalization) may see no dilemma. Second, the consequences
for democracy will also depend on the type of globalization.
In the simple model shown in Figure 5 there was just one type of globalization,
and political attitudes toward globalization will depend on political preferences regarding
the policy target variable, X. For instance, let X correspond to the wage share of national
income, with a low value of X corresponding to a low wage share. Political parties with a
preference for a high wage share will then prefer a low level of globalization (G) as that
gives them more policy space (P) to potentially achieve a high wage share (X).
Conversely, political parties with a preference for a low wage share and high profit share
will prefer a high level of globalization, because that imposes restraints on national policy
space which lower the maximum wage share that can be achieved. The implication is that
once political preferences are introduced the dilemma formulation needs to be qualified.
Globalization poses a dilemma for those whose policy possibilities are restricted, but it is
a benefit for those whose policy possibilities are enhanced.
The model in Figure 5 illustrates how globalization impacts policy space and the
significance of political preferences for understanding political attitudes toward
globalization. However, the model suffers from presenting globalization as if there is a
single unique form (G). In fact, globalization is not a monolithic outcome. Instead, it is a
designed system that works to impose new rules of economic governance.
Fifty years ago trade agreements were about reducing tariffs and quotas. Today,
they are better described as “global governance agreements (Palley, 2016)” that are

17

writing the rules of a new world order. As Renato Ruggerio (1996), the first General
Secretary of the World Trade Organization (WTO) observed at its onset: “We are no
longer writing the rules of interaction among separate national economies. We are writing
the constitution of a single global economy”. These global governance agreements
fundamentally impact national policy space. A clear example of this is the new system
governing disputes between governments and foreign-based corporate investors, which
involves an extra-legal investor – state dispute settlement (ISDS) process that is outside
of nations’ own legal systems.
The impact of globalization depends on its design, reflecting the fact that its
design comes in different political flavors. This can be illustrated through the concept of a
policy possibility frontier (PPF), as shown in Figures 7.a and 7.b. National policy
outcomes are described in terms of left/social democratic outcomes (L) and right/market
fundamentalist (R), with the policy possibility frontier (PPF) describing the mix of
outcomes that are viable. Globalization can twist the PPF, with the nature of the twist
depending on design.
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Figures 7.a and 7.b. Neoliberal globalization and the twisting of national policy space.

Left/social democratic
policy outcome (L)

Left/social democratic
policy outcome (L)

Right/market fundamentalist
policy outcome (R)
Figure 6.a. Policy space and neoliberal globalization.

Right/market fundamentalist
policy outcome (R)
Figure 6.b. Policy space and ultra-neoliberal globalization.

Figure 7.a describes the case of neoliberal or corporate globalization. The initial
PPF is described by the solid line. Neoliberal globalization rotates the PPF counterclockwise, diminishing the value of L that can be achieved. Figure 7.b describes the case
of ultra-neoliberal globalization. Again, the initial PPF is described by the solid line.
Now, not only does globalization diminish the maximum attainable value of L, it also
increases the maximum attainable value of R. Neoliberal globalization poses a dilemma
for social democrats, but it is a boon for neoliberals.
An example of the type of policy that twists the PPF as described in Figures 7.a
and 7.b is increased financial capital mobility, which enables financial markets to further
discipline governments. That diminishes space for delivering left/social democratic
outcomes (i.e. diminishes maximum L) and increases space for neoliberal outcomes (i.e.
increases maximum R).
Another example of ultra-neoliberal globalization is implementation of ISDS
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settlement procedures that allow foreign investors to sue for damages re regulations that
diminish the value of their profits. Such procedures effectively deter regulation, thereby
diminishing the value of L. Simultaneously, ISDS procedures may be paired with rules
strengthening and extending intellectual property rights that increase the maximum
attainable value of R.
An alternative left/social democratic globalization is shown in Figures 8.a and 8.b.
such a globalization would involve such policies as enforceable international labor and
environmental standards, standards governing corporate behavior, managed exchange
rates, managed capital mobility, and rules on tax transparency and tax competition (see
Palley, 2012, p. 170 – 185; 2015). Figure 8.a shows the case of social democratic
globalization which constrains market fundamentalist policy outcomes. Figure 8.b shows
the case of ultra-social democratic globalization which constrains market fundamentalist
policy outcomes and expands social democratic possibilities.

Figures 8.a and 8.b. Social democratic globalization and the twisting of national policy space.

Left/social democratic
policy outcome (L)

Left/social democratic
policy outcome (L)

Right/market fundamentalist
policy outcome (R)
Figure 7.a. Policy space and social democratic globalization.
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Right/market fundamentalist
policy outcome (R)
Figure 7.b. Policy space and ultra-social democratic globalization.

The above representation of globalization in terms of policy possibility frontiers
enriches understanding. First, and most importantly, it shows there is no unique natural
globalization. Instead, globalization varies with design so that there are different types,
and designs have different political complexions.
Second, globalization does more than “shrink” national policy space. It also
“twists” national policy space. Thus, it may shrink policy space along some dimensions
and expand it along others. The complaint with the current ultra-neoliberal globalization
is that it has twisted national policy space in favor of right/market fundamentalist
possibilities by diminishing social democratic possibilities and expanding market
fundamentalist possibilities.
Taken together, the implication is globalization operates over multiple
“dimensions”; within each dimension there are differences of “degree”; and for each
dimension there are different “types” (i.e. designs). For instance, neoliberal globalization
can be considered a mix of laissez-faire and global rule-making globalization. There is
laissez-faire with regard to movement of goods and environmental standards, but global
rule-making regarding intellectual property rights and investor rights. Labor rights are
still undecided. Moreover, the rules governing intellectual property rights and investor
rights are friendly to the interests of capital.
Third, whether globalization threatens democracy depends on political
preferences and the type of globalization. Deep global economic integration along
neoliberal lines may destabilize democracy, but deep global integration along social
democratic lines may strengthen it. The history of the European Union (EU) offers some
evidence supportive of that claim. In the three decades after World War II the EU
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promoted deep economic integration along social democratic lines and democracy
appeared to strengthen. Since then, the EU has shifted to promoting deep economic
integration along neoliberal lines and democracy appears to have become more wobbly.
6. Some further complications: globalization and policy lock-in
So far, the analysis has focused on how globalization may diminish national policy space.
However, there is an additional complication which is that the diminution of policy space
can be permanent owing to policy lock-in. In terms of Figure 5, globalization may be a
one way choice that is irreversible. Having moved away from autarky toward more
globalization, it may not be possible to move back in the direction of autarky.
Political scientists (Gill, 1998; Gill and Carter, 2014) emphasize how neoliberal
globalization has created a new constitutionalist politics that creates lock-in of
international economic governance. That governance lock-in is matched by economic
lock-in. The economic theory of policy lock-in (Palley, 2017) draws on the concept of
hysteresis, which is a concept drawn from physical chemistry. Systems can change their
behavioral characteristics by passing through trigger thresholds that act as “switch-on” or
“switch-off” mechanisms. In physical chemistry, passing through the switch-on threshold
acts as a switch that changes the systems behavior. The new behavioral pattern remains in
place until the system passes through the switch-off threshold, at which time the system
reverts to its old behavior.
The theory of policy lock-in holds that economic policies, including those
associated with globalization, can trigger hysteretic developments in the economic and
political system that lock-in policies and lock-out other possibilities. First, policy changes
may induce hysteretic changes in the structure of the economy and those changes can
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make it costly to reverse policy. Second, changes in the economy (even if they are not
permanent) may induce hysteretic changes in the political process, thereby permanently
changing the political equilibrium and locking-in policy.5
Lock-in via globalization is accomplished via multiple mechanisms including
network effects, exit costs, and permanently changed political equilibrium. Trade
agreements create new rules, which foster new patterns of global production that set the
basis for negotiation of future trade and investment agreements. This process of
expanding globalization resembles the building of a network (Palley, 2007). For instance,
NAFTA established the template for the WTO. Exiting the network is costly for
individual countries as they face loss of market access and punitive retaliatory measures.
Country go-it-alone reversal of globalization is also discouraged by other large exit costs
associated with disrupting existing production and supply chains and reorganizing them
along more national lines.6
Globalization policy lock-in also results from permanent changes in the political
equilibrium. Businesses that have made sunk investment costs in globalization will lobby
to retain the system. That includes multinational corporations which have invested
offshore, and domestic businesses which rely on imports and have invested in global
supply chains. Domestic manufacturers have shut down and their organization capital has
been destroyed, raising the cost of reopening. Furthermore, trade unions were
concentrated in domestic manufacturing and they have been decimated. That has
dramatically changed the political equilibrium and, to the extent the take-off of unions
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The notion of political equilibrium is discussed by Acemoglu and Robinson (2013).
Brexit and the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union provides another illustration of lock-in
owing to costs of exit. The U.K. may still decide to exit for political reasons, but the cost of exit is likely to
prove large and that is prompting a backlash and rethink of Brexit.
6
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was the product of a unique historical era (the 1930s), it is difficult to rebuild union
membership. In sum, globalization contains a powerful structural economic lock-in
dynamic that serves to strengthen political forces favoring globalization and weaken the
forces against it.
The impact of globalization lock-in is easily illustrated using Figure 5. As
globalization deepens, it reduces policy space. The current level of globalization is G0.
Globalization lock-in means policymakers can further deepen the level of globalization
(i.e. increase G) but not reverse it (i.e. decrease G). Viewed in that light, globalization is
like a ratchet. Each new step reduces policy space, either by taking policy options entirely
off the table or by reducing the effectiveness and scope of existing policy options. A clear
example of this impact of globalization is corporate tax policy, where globalization has
diminished what is deemed feasible.
Lock-in by globalization has additional anti-democratic implications. By itself,
globalization may shrink the extent of policy space. If there is also lock-in, that shrinking
becomes irreversible (or at least very costly to reverse). However, the process (or form)
of democracy remains intact. Second, the problematic of diminished scope of policy
choice also afflicts undemocratic polities so it is not democracy per se that is
incompatible. All national political systems may find themselves stressed. Third, the
political implications of loss of policy choices depends on the type of globalization. That
loss may be of no political consequence if the gains from globalization (i.e. deep
economic integration) are politically popular. Here, the history of the EU is relevant
again. Deep European economic integration was popular when it was generating widely
shared economic gains.
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7. Globalization and current political developments: anti-democratic backlash and
political brittleness
The above arguments help understand current political developments which are marked
by anti-democratic backlash and political brittleness.
7.a) Globalization and democracy: anti-democratic backlash and elite responsibility
In many countries there now appears to be a nationalist anti-democratic backlash that
takes the form of gravitation toward right-wing political parties with authoritarian
inclinations.7 That backlash is partly attributed to globalization, particularly tradeinduced manufacturing job loss and increased immigration. The popular demand is for
reassertion of national sovereignty.
The backlash raises several important issues. First, it tacitly questions economists’
claims regarding the economic gains from deep international integration. Second, it
spotlights the political costs of globalization which are not factored in to economists’
globalization benefit – cost analysis.
Unfortunately, it is easy to characterize the backlash as just the intolerance of
“deplorables”, when there is actually good political reason for the backlash. The current
incarnation of globalization reflects two features. First, it is an elite project, supported by
both sides of the political establishment. Second, the project has been designed according
to the ideology and principles of neoliberal economics. That political configuration has
blocked alternative policies, and has also blocked relief from the economic injuries
inflicted by neoliberal globalization. In turn, that has fostered the anti-democratic anti-
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In the US it is evidenced by the 2016 election of President Donald Trump and the embrace of his politics
by the Republican Party. In Western Europe it is evidenced by the Brexit controversy and the rise of rightwing political parties in national legislatures.
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establishment backlash.
Better if the backlash had taken the form of push for an alternative globalization,
but that is not how politics often works in stressed times.8 Instead, the combination of
economic distress, lack of establishment leadership, and a dominant economic ideology
that suppresses awareness of alternatives, has facilitated a nationalist anti-democratic
backlash. Viewed in that light, the deep responsibility for the backlash lies with
establishment elites who designed and implemented neoliberal globalization, and
combined to block alternatives.
That brings us back to political critique of the trilemma which unwittingly
obscures that responsibility. The reason is the trilemma’s incomplete representation of
available policy choices, particularly regarding the possibility of alternative nation state
sponsored globalization as discussed in Section 5 above. The incomplete representation
obscure the fact that globalization has been an explicit political choice defined by
“degree” of globalization, “type” of globalization, and “dimensions’ of globalization.
7.b Globalization and democracy: lock-in and political brittleness
A second feature of the current political environment is a tendency to political brittleness,
defined as abrupt changes of policy direction and arrangements. Such brittleness is
exemplified by the Brexit saga. Lock-in offers an explanation of why political change
may be abrupt and marked by crisis.
Lock-in implies it is costly to exit existing economic and political arrangements.
Consequently, polities may remain attached to dysfunctional governance and policy
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In fact, there has been a significant amount of push for an alternative globalization but, for complex
reasons beyond the scope of the current discussion, it has not gained the same political traction as the
nationalist right-wing backlash.
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regimes until the costs of not addressing existing problems are perceived to exceed the
costs of exiting the system. When the burdens of the existing policy regime system are
small, it is not worth paying the large costs of exit. However, once those burdens become
large, the calculus may suddenly reverse and the regime may collapse abruptly. Lock-in
therefore provides an explanation of why political and economic breaks often tend to be
big, costly, and discrete when they happen.
That dynamic appears to characterize recent “populist” political developments
which challenge the neoliberal policy paradigm and globalization. Electorates may be
reaching the point where the costs of policy exit are perceived to be less than the costs of
sticking with the current policy regime.
From a political perspective, globalization lock-in compounds the challenge of
diminished national policy space and may increase the likelihood of an anti-democratic
turn. If electorates feel they are permanently unable to address economic inequities
generated by globalization, that may generate political frustrations which express
themselves in an anti-democratic turn. In sum, lock-in can help explain both political
brittleness and anti-democratic political turns. However, such outcomes are only a
possibility and not an inevitability.9
8. Conclusion
The political economy of globalization is often framed in terms of Rodrik’s (2011)
globalization political trilemma. This paper has proposed a reframing that rests on
national policy space. Globalization causes changes in national policy space that have
drop-down implications for national sovereignty and democratic politics.

9

Greece is instructive in this regard. Greece has found itself locked into the euro, but democratic politics
have persisted. The important point is that lock-in implies nothing inevitable for democracy.
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In analyzing the impact on sovereignty there is need to distinguish between
“formal” and “effective” sovereignty. With regard to democratic politics, there is need to
distinguish between “process” and “content”.
Globalization involves choices regarding the “degree” of international economic
integration, the “type” of international economic integration, and the “dimension” of
international economic integration. That makes it a fundamentally political project.
The multi-faceted nature of the choices mean there are no inevitable implications
for sovereignty and democracy. To the extent that globalization is now driving a
nationalistic anti-democratic turn in politics, the responsibility lies with political elites.
Globalization has been a bi-partisan elite project, designed according to neoliberal
principles. That configuration has inflicted economic injury while blocking alternative
policies, in turn fostering an anti-democratic anti-establishment backlash.
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